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    This paper takes the view that financial sector reform is 
not only a matter of jettisoning old regulations nor even 
merely a matter of prudential regulation accompanying 
structural deregulation; it is intimately bound up with 
institutional and technological issues.  On the basis of a 
detailed analysis of the stock market, debt market and the 
banking system the paper demonstrates the need for major 
institutional and technological changes in the Indian 
financial sector in order to face the challenges posed by 
liberalization and rapid growth.  In our view, the 
government and regulatory authorities have an important 
role in facilitating this modernization.  Not only should 
regulatory hindrances be removed, but there should be a 
positive bias in favour of change.  We do believe that 
changes would take place even without regulatory support, 
but we also believe that regulatory intervention could 
hasten the process and make it less painful.  This is 
because the technology is characterized by large 
externalities and often requires action at the industry level. 
  Financial Sector Reform: 




Financial sector reform is an important component of the ongoing process of liberalization of the 
Indian economy.  The securities scam has only served to lend heightened urgency to this task.  This 
paper takes the view that financial sector reform is not only a matter of jettisoning old regulations nor 
even merely a matter of prudential regulation accompanying structural deregulation.  We argue that 
regulatory measures are only a precondition for the essential part of financial sector reform which is a 
radical overhaul of the institutional structure and technological infrastructure of the financial services 
industry.  A great deal of the institutional and technological change will doubtless take place at the 
level of the individual firm and will be propelled by the competitive market forces unleashed by the 
process of liberalization.  Nevertheless, several of these changes are characterized by large 
externalities and may require action at the industry level.  Regulatory authorities may therefore have 
an important role to play in facilitating if not encouraging these changes.  This paper examines these 
issues in the context of three important segments of the financial sector: the stock market, the debt 
market and the banking system.  We do not claim that these are the only three components of the 





Need for a major strategic shift 
 
It is now recognized world over, including in communist China, that well functioning capital markets 
are absolutely essential for sustained economic growth.  The 1975 Securities Amendments Act of 
USA states: "The Congress finds that the securities markets are an important asset which must be 
preserved and strengthened".  In India, the task of development and regulation of the stock markets 
has been entrusted to the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI).  In a comprehensive study 
of the regulatory impact of SEBI, Barua (1993) concluded that SEBI has got bogged down with 
detailed operational level problems instead of initiating major strategic shifts in the operation and 
management of the markets.  While the study identified several major shortcomings in SEBI's 
functioning and reforms the two aspects that are important for the purposes of this paper are as 
follows: 
 
*  The attempted reforms of SEBI are based on the implicit assumption that the current systems 




tinkered with the existing methods, to make the markets more efficient and fair.  No attempt 
has been made to think of radically different methods of operating the markets.  
 
*  The reforms initiated appear disjointed.  They lack a clear direction.  There is also a lack of 
appreciation of the fact that a change in one sub-system often needs accompanying changes in 
the other sub-systems for it to be implementable and sustainable.  A holistic view thus must 
precede any intervention.  This kind of global perspective is completely lacking in SEBI's 
initiatives. 
 
Barua went on to argue that unless these issues were addresses, there is a danger that the securities 
market, instead of being an engine of growth of the economy, may become a drag on the economy.  
The most important functions of capital markets is efficient allocation of capital, which means that 
capital should be made available to the most profitable investment opportunities in the economy.  The 
allocative efficiency of capital markets is determined by two other efficiencies, namely informational 
efficiency and operational efficiency of the markets.  A market is informationally efficient if the 
prices of securities fully reflect all the information relevant for their valuation.  A market is 
operationally efficient if it is possible to carry out transactions in the market with ease and at no cost.   
 
Operational Efficiency 
The operational efficiency of a market is determined by the cost and the time taken to carry out 
transactions in the market.  The lower the cost of transactions and lower the time taken to complete 
them, the higher would be the operational efficiency of the market.  Since only brokers are allowed to 
transact in the market, investors have to route all their buying and selling of securities through 
brokers.  The three distinct phases of completing a transaction are: 
 
*  Placing an order with a broker. 
 
*  Receiving a contract note from the broker if the order has been carried out. 
 
*  Making payment to the broker and receiving certificates in exchange if securities have been 
bought or delivering certificates to the broker and receiving payment if securities have been 
sold. 
 
While the process appears simple, in reality investors have to contend with a variety of problems.  The 
cost of transactions for individual investors, particularly if they happen to be small is very high as 




after certificates have been delivered and in receiving certificates after payment has been made is 
quite common.  Though investors do have the facility of complaining to the stock exchange 
authorities, the process is cumbersome and time consuming.  Besides, investors are reluctant to pick a 
quarrel with their brokers.  As a result, investors in India have accepted these hazards as part of the 
risk one has to take to invest in securities.  The woes of buyers do not end with acquisition of 
securities from the brokers, since the securities have to be sent to the company for transfer to their 
names.  Even this is a long drawn and stressful process since it is not uncommon for companies to 
return the certificates untransferred on some pretext or the other.  Indian capital markets are 
operationally extremely inefficient and radical changes are needed to facilitate buying and selling of 
securities.  These are discussed below. 
 
Use of Information Technology (IT) 
 
Traditionally securities transactions have been carried out by traders gathering on the floor of a stock 
exchange to quote buy and sell prices and strike a deal when the quotes matched.  With the advent of 
computers, the exchanges came to provide a range of post-trade services such as clearance and 
settlement of transactions to their members.  The last decade has however seen Information 
Technology (IT) bring about major changes not only in the clearance and settlement systems but also 
in the trading of securities.  The use of modern data processing and communication technologies 
significantly improves the efficiency and effectiveness of market operations.  The benefits are so 
immense in relation to the costs of using these technologies that even emerging markets such as those 
of Malaysia, Mexico and Korea opted for computerized securities transactions and settlement systems. 
 Some of the East European countries too such as Poland and Hungary, which do not even have a well 
functioning financial system, are setting up computerized stock markets from the beginning, leap 
frogging over the traditional stages of market development.  In India we continue to use the manual 
method of trading in securities, with very basic level of computerisation of the back office activities.  
It is time to bring in IT in a major way in the Indian markets, because only then can capital markets in 
India achieve international standards of efficiency, fairness and stability.  
 
Promoting use of IT should be the topmost priority of SEBI, because this measure alone can take care 
of perhaps 90% of the problems in the market operations today.  As mentioned earlier, the benefits are 
so immense that emerging economies and even economies with fledgling financial systems are opting 
for computerized trading and settlement systems.  India has well established and fairly 
professionalised financial system and stock markets.  Therefore, transition to a computerized system 
is possible quickly.  The initiative in the matter has to be taken by SEBI.  Some of the principles on 





*  The system should meet the prevailing legal requirements.  It may be necessary to change the 
legal provisions before a fully automated system, based on "book entry" can be implemented. 
 For example, the current requirement of transfer deed being signed by both the parties may 
have to be done away with, as no signatures would be required in the book entry system. 
 
*  The system must operate in an equitable manner, providing equal access to all participants.  It 
should also be equitable in terms of providing information to all market participants.  No 
participant should have advantage either through early receipt of information or through 
receiving some information on an exclusive basis. 
 
*  The system has to be tested at the time of implementation and periodically afterwards to 
assess the risk of unauthorized access and system failure due to human error.  It may also be 
desirable to plan for contingencies arising from natural catastrophes such as fire or flooding 
affecting the system. 
 
*  SEBI as the regulatory authority may provide some more safeguards over and above those 
that are built into the system, particularly in respect of interactions between the securities 
markets and other organizations in the financial system. 
 
The first computerized system was implemented by the Toronto Stock Exchange, Canada
i.  The 
system is known as CATS (Computer Assisted Trading System).  This system has been bought by 
Tokyo, Sao Paulo, Paris, Lyon, Brussels and Madrid.  The systems operating in Korea, Malaysia and 
Taiwan developed their local systems patterned after CATS.  It would be worthwhile to briefly list the 
main features of CATS: 
 
*  Price Quotation and Trading:  CATS is an order driven system.  The screen displays the size 
of order, the price and the identity of the intermediary who has entered the order. 
 
*  Order Execution:  The buy and sell orders are matched and executed if possible.  The 
confirmations are immediately sent to the concerned parties. 
 
*  Clearing and Settlement:  The centralized custodial and clearing facility is provided by the 
Canadian Depository and Securities Limited (CDS).  CATS provides an Order Management 






*  Market Surveillance:  The CATS market surveillance system contains pre-set surveillance 
parameters for price and volume for every security.  Any trading activity exceeding these 
limits is signalled to the market supervisor. 
 
*  Market Information:  The CATS software creates a database based on the data generated by 
trading.  These can be accessed by those connected on the network. 
 
Today several similar systems are available.  Most of these systems would have features similar to 
those listed above.  To cut down the time of implementation, SEBI should evaluate the various 
systems available and acquire one, rather than attempt to develop an indigenous system.  Over time, 
the system acquired may be modified to incorporate special requirements.   
 
Restructuring of Markets 
 
There are 22 stock exchanges in the country today.  Many securities are listed and traded in several 
stock exchanges.  The fragmentation of markets, particularly when the floating stock is not large, 
leads to a situation where the same security may be quoted at widely different prices at the same time 
because of differences in the local demand and supply conditions.  The differences in the settlement 
systems from market to market also has considerable impact on prices.  While Bombay has "carry 
forward" system of trading in addition to "cash" system, Madras has only cash trading system.  While 
in Bombay settlement takes place about once every two weeks, in Madras settlement takes place every 
three trading days.  Though Ahmedabad, Delhi and Calcutta follow the same system of trading as 
Bombay, the settlement periods in various stock exchanges are  not synchronised.  The lack of 
synchronisation often leads to distortions in prices.  An example of this is to be found in the closing 
prices of the well traded Reliance shares on July 30, 1993 in the two well connected markets at 
Bombay and Ahmedabad: Price at Bombay: Rs. 236, Price at Ahmedabad: Rs. 225, a difference of 
almost 5%.
ii   It is not uncommon to observe far wider differences between prices prevailing in any 
two markets, particularly in cases of less active securities.  All these have created a situation for 
investors where they can never be quite certain whether they are getting the best possible prices.  
These problems can be overcome only by linking all the markets, which would enhance efficiency by 
generating greater competition and wider dissemination of information to brokers and investors.  
 
In the recent past, several developments have taken place to modernize Indian capital markets.  The 
Stock Holding Corporation of India Limited (SHCIL) is planning to establish a National Clearing and 




will provide fully computerized facility for trading (initially) in fixed return securities at Bombay.  It 
would be possible to transact from all over the country, through terminals linked to the NSE.  A move 
should be initiated by SEBI to fit all these separate efforts, with its own initiative of integrating all the 
stock markets, so that a comprehensive automated system of trading and settlement in all types of 




Technology is only one component of an automated trading and settlement system.  The most 
important challenge here is institutional in nature (Varma, 1993):  it is necessary to have a network of 
custodians and depositary institutions who will hold shares on behalf of the investors and will allow 
shares to be traded by mere book entries.  The principal obstacle is that there are no credible 
institutions which can play this role.  Stock brokers are a natural choice but they would not satisfy the 
capital adequacy requirements that SEBI would, quite rightly, like to impose on a custodian.  At the 
same time there is a network of bank branches which covers the whole country and has built up the 
required degree of credibility.  Nobody has the slightest hesitation today in keeping jewellery on safe 
deposit with the bank.  If the banks were to accept this responsibility, not only would they have a 
profitable line of business, but they would also be promoting the development of the capital market by 
facilitating the move towards scripless trading.  In fact, we can switch completely to scripless trading 
within months.  Considering a market capitalization of Rs. 200,000 crore and taking the custodial 
charge very conservatively at 0.25% to 0.50%, the potential revenue to the banking system is about 
Rs. 500 to Rs. 1,000 crore.  The incremental investment required for this purpose is quite minimal 
since the branch network is already in place.  Banks however seem to have a narrow view of what 




Increasing the informational efficiency of the stock market has two major aspects: (a) improving 





Improving Corporate Disclosures 
 
The quality and frequency of accounting information provided to investors in India is abominable.  
Till recently, even this poor quality information about the financial performance of a company was 
available only once a year.  Now the frequency has doubled, as the companies are required to 
announce half yearly performance.  However, to avoid announcing poor results in the middle of the 
accounting year, companies have resorted to announcing "unaudited" results which could be altered at 
the end of the year without being on the wrong side of the law.  In this age of Information 
Technology, the frequency with which companies should be required to provide information ought to 
be much higher.  There is also an urgent need to overhaul our accounting standards to ensure that the 
accounting numbers present a fair and complete picture about the financial performance of 
companies. 
 
Development of Security Analysts 
 
A major lacuna in the Indian markets is the absence of financial analysts who would forecast 
corporate performance based on flow of information to the market.  Because of this, an investor is left 
to his own resources to analyse the annual statements of companies and interpret changes in the 
government policies.  Since the ultimate protection for an investor is efficient processing of 
information, it is necessary to develop the profession of financial analysts.   
 
The debate on the badla system 
 
The debate on the badla system brings out very clearly the importance of technological and 
institutional aspects in stock market reform.  The proposal by the SEBI to abolish badla provoked a 
widespread debate on the role of the badla system as a form of forward market which provides 
opportunities for hedging and speculation.  Barua and Varma (1994) pointed out that the badla system 
however performs another major function, that of ensuring smooth functioning of the cash (spot) 
market despite several market imperfections. This second function is important because if market 
imperfections are not taken care of, they could disrupt the functioning of the options and futures 
markets as well as the cash markets.  
 
A major imperfection (operational inefficiency) in the Indian capital market is the enormous time 
taken by companies to transfer ownership of shares to buyers as discussed above.  Though the law 




transfer to take much longer.  The situation is particularly bad when the books of a company are 
closed for deciding the list of persons who are to receive some benefits on rights basis.  During this 
period, the badla system ensures that the significant reduction in the floating stock does not cause a 
major disruption in the pricing process.  This is done through the facility of carry forward of 
transactions and also by allowing a longer badla period at the time of book closure.  Without this 
facility, the reduction of floating stock would have a serious disruptive impact not only on the cash 
market, but also on the options and futures markets.  This is because of the intimate relationship that 
exists between the spot (cash) market and the  options and futures markets.  
 
Options and futures contracts are ultimately settled through operation in the spot (cash) market.  For 
example, the writer of a call option may have to buy the requisite number of shares from the spot 
(cash) market if the buyer of the call option exercises the option.  Similarly, a person who has sold 
shares through a futures contract would be required buy them in the spot (cash) market to be able to 
deliver the shares sold at the time of maturity of the contract.  If these contracts mature during the 
book closure period there could be a spurt in the prices of shares in the cash market which is totally 
unrelated to the financial fundamentals of the company.  This problem is aggravated by the fact that 
almost all options and futures contract mature on a few standard maturity dates.  Since it is not 
uncommon for a company to close its books several times a year (for determining rights), the problem 
created by reduction in the floating stock would be a recurrent one.  And every time the books are 
closed and the floating stocks are reduced, the maturing options and futures contracts would create 
havoc in the cash market. 
 
It is clear therefore that if badla is to be replaced by options and futures markets the delays in transfer 
of shares have to be eliminated.  The answer as already argued above lies in immobilizing share 
certificates and introducing scripless trading. 
 
In the absence of the badla system, the delay in transfer of shares (to the buyers) would lead to 
another serious difficulty for investors in the cash market itself.  Since the carry forward facility 
would not be available, they would be unable to resell the shares which they have bought for several 
months after the shares have been sent for transfer.  The badla system helps overcome this difficulty 
by allowing an investor to sell and carry forward the sale till he is able to deliver the shares after they 
are transferred to his name.  If the badla system is discontinued and the transfer period continues to be 
as long as it is today, the cash market would be seriously disrupted.   
 
Another major imperfection in the Indian market arises from the settlement system which does not 




world use a rolling settlement system, with transactions done on day T being settled on day "T+n" 
with n varying from 2 to 5 days.  Since most of them also have scripless trading, it is possible to effect 
transfer of money as well as scrips almost simultaneously immediately after the transactions are 
settled.  In India, the major markets use fixed settlement cycles; the BSE follows a two week 
settlement period for forward shares and a three week settlement period for cash shares.  Since the 
settlement cycles for the cash and forward shares do not coincide, even when an investor has sold in 
the cash market, he may not be in a position to use the cash due to him to meet the cash required for 
purchases he may have made of shares listed in the forward category.  The same problem can arise 
even for the shares in the forward category since the "pay in day" precedes the "pay out day" by two 
to three days.  That is, the payment for purchases has to be made before payment for sales are 
received.  While a broker is permitted to net out his purchases against sales, an investor may not enjoy 
the same facility.  The problem is exacerbated by the unwillingness of banks to lend against shares. 
 
The badla system helps in tiding over these rigidities.  Of course, an investor may have to incur a 
charge for using the facility, but that is better than having no facility at all.  If badla is banned, the 
entire settlement and transfer procedure would have to be speeded up.  Both scripless trading and 
computerization of settlement of transactions would become imperative.  Improvement in 
communications facilities will also be needed to ensure that investors located away from cities with 
active stock markets do not suffer unduly.  
 
To sum up, the badla system in addition to providing facility for risk hedging and speculations 
performs an immensely important function of ensuring that the cash market functions smoothly 
despite imperfections and rigidities in the Indian market.  While options and futures can replace badla 
in terms of providing facilities for risk hedging and speculation, they can not help in overcoming the 
impact of imperfections on the operation of the cash market.  In fact the imperfections in the market 
are such that they would create immense difficulties in smooth operation of the options and futures 
markets.  Abolition of badla must therefore be the culmination of a comprehensive package of 
reforms aimed at a thorough modernization of our capital markets.  The important point is that 




The analysis in this section draws heavily on Barua et al (1993) which carried out a comprehensive 





Market Making and Distribution 
 
Throughout the world, trading in debt instruments relies on market makers and is conducted in an 
over-the-counter market rather than in the stock exchange itself.  The major obstacle in doing so in 
India has been the absence of market makers with the requisite financial resources.  Market making is 
capital intensive;  the Discount and Finance House of India with its large credit line from the Reserve 
Bank of India often finds that it is reduced to the status of just another player because it has too little 
money.  Only the banks and the big financial institutions have the financial resources to play the 
market making role in India. 
 
Over the last few months, we have seen an increasing integration of the government bond market with 
the free market.  Consequently, the potential now exists for tapping the household sector directly for 
subscribing to government debt.  The banking system can be a powerful channel for retailing 
government bonds.  It is interesting in this context to observe that the Bank of England recently 
opened the government securities market to small investors at the auction stage itself through the 
ingenious mechanism of non competitive bids in its auction of 7.25% Treasury Stock 1998 on April 
28, 1993
iii.  Under this scheme, large investors have to bid for the stock on a competitive basis while 
small investors (bidding for amounts up to £ 500,000) have to make non competitive bids.  The small 
investor would then get the stock at the average of the prices at which competitive bids have been 
accepted.   
 
Financing and Hedging Options 
 
Market makers need finance and hedging facilities.  In developed markets, market makers have large 
capital resources of their own and are also able to borrow on the security of their inventory of 
securities in the repurchase (repo) market.  In India, market makers have been severely 
undercapitalized; even the Discount and Finance House of India which is owned by the Reserve Bank 
of India has too little capital to play an effective role in the huge government securities market.   
 
As far as the repo market is concerned, traders in government securities did in the past resort to the 
ready-forward market which is similar to a repo market, but in the aftermath of the securities scam 
this market has been restricted to treasury bills and a couple of short-term dated securities.  The repo 
transaction is one in which the dealer sells securities to a lender and agrees to repurchase them at the 
end of a specified period (the duration of the loan) at a specified price (which equals the selling price 




repo is for all practical purposes a short term secured loan to the dealer and is regarded as a safe form 
of lending.  In well developed debt markets, therefore, the market makers are able to borrow on repo 
basis at low rates of interest.  In India, during the securities scam, a total breakdown of control 
systems led to the repo transaction becoming unsecured and the funds being diverted to stock market 
speculators.  Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the scam, the repo market itself has been discredited 
and it will take some time for its credibility to be reestablished.  Changes are also required in 
government (Reserve Bank) regulations which restrict access to the repos market and also restrict the 
repo to a narrow range of instruments.  In our view, repos must be permitted in all debt securities - 
government, public sector and corporate.  Access to the repo market must also be widened to include 
any player who satisfies basic capital adequacy requirements. 
 
Market makers also need hedging opportunities to ensure that prices do not move against them while 
they are holding a position.  For example, in the US market, a dealer who takes a position in say 
Medium Term Notes (MTNs) would often take an offsetting position in the interest rate futures or 
swaps market to hedge the interest rate risk on his position.  Similar facilities do not exist in India in 
the absence of any forward, futures and options markets.  Creation of these markets is an important 
institutional imperative as discussed below. 
 
Interest Rate Derivatives 
 
In an era of administered interest rates, most market participants tended to ignore the risk of interest 
rate fluctuations.  As interest rates in different segments of the financial system are being freed, 
interest rate risk is rapidly becoming a very major factor in the debt market.  Mechanisms for hedging 
this risk need to be created quite quickly.  The immediate need is for a futures market in government 
securities: a T-Bill future and a government bond future.   
 
The increasing popularity of floating rate instruments would eventually lead to the development of a 
large interest rate swap market.  This market may initially be an inter-bank market and the 





Bond Market Information Services 
 
The financial services industry needs to upgrade the services relating to the debt market.  Credit rating 
is already available but more competition is desirable in this field especially from the private sector.  
Studies of CRISIL's credit ratings by Raghunathan and Varma (1992 and 1993) have shown that these 
ratings are not only too liberal by international standards, but are also internally inconsistent.  There is 
also a need for multiple ratings of the same instruments, unsolicited ratings, more active monitoring of 
existing ratings and greater transparency and objectivity in the rating process. 
 
Information dissemination needs to be improved significantly.  For example, there is virtually no 
organized information available on historical default rates in any segment of the debt market.  It is 
also desirable to develop a comprehensive bond index which apart from being an important analytical 
tool for management of bond portfolios, would also enable the creation of a bond index future in due 
course.   
 
Bond Market Trading Practices and Systems 
 
Computerized custodial and clearing services are as important in the debt market as in the stock 
market and in many ways, it may be easier to develop these services first in the debt market.  The 
proposal of the National Stock Exchange (NSE) to focus on the debt market in the initial stage could 
be a good opportunity to promotes these services, but one is not sure that the NSE has devoted 
adequate thought to settlement issues. 
 
Another major problem in the debt market relates to the lack of standardization of trading practices.  
Even the most basic issues are not adequately resolved and standardized: the trading lot, the basis of 
computation of accrued interest (360-day-year versus 365-day-year and 30-day-month versus actual 
days), and the deduction of the so-called "voucher" for tax deduction at source.  Procedures for trade 
netting and settlement are if anything even more primitive than in the stock market.  As the 
government debt market expands to include a larger spectrum of participants, these institutional issues 





Housing Finance and Securitization 
 
The housing stock in India in 1989-90 was valued at about Rs. 300,000 crore
iv making it one of the 
largest components of the country's capital stock.  Though real estate is an excellent collateral for 
debt, the mortgage finance market in India is very poorly developed for a variety of reasons.  First of 
all, the formal sector (banks, insurance companies, housing finance institutions and other financial 
institutions) have concentrated on lending for new housing construction.  But even in financing new 
housing, the role of the formal sector is very small.  A study group of the planning commission found 
that only 16% of the financing need was met by the formal sector and the remaining 84% came from 
the households themselves or their employers
v.   
 
The National Housing Policy has recognized the need to integrate housing finance into the rest of the 




*  Subsidized interest rates on housing finance would have to be gradually eliminated.  
 
*  Housing finance institutions should have access to funds on a competitive basis with other 
financial institutions. 
 
*  A secondary mortgage market must be created to attract funds from a wide range of investors. 
 
The key step in the creation of a secondary mortgage market is the securitization of mortgage debt.  
Since mortgages are very safe and secure assets, they are the ideal candidate for securitization.  The 
advantages of securitization of mortgages are: 
 
*  By tapping a wider investor base, it will reduce the funds constraint in housing finance. 
*  By making mortgages more easily tradeable, it will improve the tradability of encumbered 
real estate.  Thus the real estate market will be better integrated with the rest of the financial 
system. 
*  It will enable, the vast banking network to provide housing finance without committing its 
own resources on a large scale.  This will complement the intended objective of NHB to 
refinance housing loans. 
 





There is a great deal of international experience available on how mortgage backed securities can be 
successfully created and traded.  The major problems in doing that in India are of a legal nature 
dealing with land ceiling laws, stamp duties and foreclosures.  There is a general agreement that 
changes need to be made in this area, but progress on the actual legislation has been rather slow.  
Meanwhile, it may be possible to circumvent some of the legal constraints by resorting to the existing 
laws on trusts and cooperatives. 
 
Institutional Initiatives Needed 
 
In the US securitization of mortgages has taken several forms of which the most important are Pass-
through Certificates, Mortgage Backed Bonds and Collateralized Mortgage Obligations.  We think 
that in the Indian context, mortgage backed bonds and collateralized mortgage backed obligations are 
more sophisticated instruments which can evolve later in response to investor needs.  Mortgage 
securitization in India should begin with pass-throughs.  
 
Mortgage pass-throughs are created by an "originator" who has to perform the following important 
functions: 
 
*    The originator pools together several housing mortgages of similar maturity and 
issues pass-through certificates which represent an undivided interest in this pool.   
 
*    The mortgages which are being pooled would have arisen from housing loans given 
by the banks, housing finance institutions or other lenders.  The originator would buy 
these loans from the lenders who would continue to service the loans: they would 
collect the instalments from the house-owners and pass them on to the originator for a 
fee. 
 
*    The originator performs credit enhancement by guaranteeing the timely repayment of 
interest and principal.  The originator would charge a fee for this.  A separate agency 
(for example, an insurance company) could perform this credit enhancement. 
 
*    The originator would pass on the interest and principal repayment to the investors 





For example, the National Housing Bank (through a separate subsidiary if necessary) could take up 
the function of the originator of pass-through certificates. Since the mandate of the NHB is to 
refinance housing loans, securitization can be regarded as an obvious extension of this role.  The NHB 
also has adequate capital resources to perform the functions of an originator. The credit enhancement 





Asset Reconstruction Fund (ARF) 
 
It is more than two years since the Narasimham Committee recommended the creation of an Asset 
Reconstruction Fund (ARF) to take over the problem assets of the banks at a discount as part of the 
process of starting Indian banking on a clean slate untainted by the follies of the past.  During these 
last two years of debate about the proposal, the basic arguments in favour of the ARF have not been 
disputed: (a) it ensures that the energies of the bank management are not diverted from the important 
task of building for the future; (b) once the problem assets have been taken off their balance sheet, the 
banks can be held accountable for their future performance (they can no longer attribute their 
problems to the legacies of the past); and (c) a specialized agency like the ARF would be able to 
recover the assets more quickly. 
 
Narasimham Committee's Proposal 
 
The Narasimham Committee's proposal was that the ARF would buy the asset at a discount to be 
determined by independent auditors.  Presumably, the auditors would value each non performing asset 
at its current recoverable value
viii.   For example, if the recoverable value is 75% of its nominal value, 
the ARF would presumably buy the loan at a discount of 25%.  This purchase price would, under the 
committee's plan, be paid in the form of five year bonds guaranteed by the Central government (and, 
therefore, qualifying for SLR purposes).  Effectively, the Committee was asking the government to 
finance the ARF completely.  This appears to be a major reason why the government has now rejected 
the idea of a generalized nation-wide ARF.  Schemes which do not require government funding have 
therefore become imperative.   The discussion paper brought out by the government for the Finance 
Minister's discussions with the chiefs of public sector banks says that "... banks may wish to explore 
other financial and organizational devices to segregate the bad portfolios so as to clear the balance 
sheet of the main bank... A number of financial engineering innovations have been pioneered by 





A self-financing ARF 
 
Varma (1993) proposed a self-financing ARF: 
 
1.  The ARF would buy the asset not at the recoverable value but at a discount of say 10% from 
the recoverable value.  The ARF would pay this price partly in cash and partly in bonds: 
 
  a)  Half of the purchase price would be paid in cash which will be raised from market 
borrowings as described in item 2 below. 
 
  b)  The ARF would pay the remaining half of the purchase price in bonds (as described 
in item 3 below).  The bonds would not be guaranteed by the government. 
 
2.  The ARF would finance the cash payment by raising money in the market through an issue of 
senior bonds collateralized by the assets of the ARF on a sans recourse basis.  The bonds are 
senior in the sense that they rank above the subordinated bonds described above.  They are 
sans recourse in the sense that if the collateral proves to be inadequate to pay the bonds, the 
ARF would have no liability for the deficit.  (There is no government guarantee either.)  This 
would be acceptable to the investor because the bonds would be heavily over-collateralized.  
Senior bonds would be issued only to the extent of 50% of the purchase price which in turn is 
equal only to 90% of the recoverable value of the asset.  This means that the fair value of the 
collateral is about 220% of the face value of the bond.  (In terms of the book value of the 
loans, the collateralization would be even higher say 300%.)   With such heavy over-
collateralization, bonds can be sold on sans recourse basis as has been demonstrated in debt 
securitization programs in other parts of the world.  In the US, for example, mortgage 
collateralized bonds (without any defeasance clause) are issued on sans recourse basis with an 




3.  The ARF would issue subordinated participating sans recourse bonds to the banks of a face 
value equal to 50% of the purchase price of assets bought from them.  The bonds are 
subordinated in the sense that they rank below any other bonds that may be issued by the 
ARF.  They are participating in the sense that they participate in the profits that the ARF 
makes by recovering more than the purchase price of the asset.  For example, 95% of the 
profits could be distributed to the participating bond holders; the remaining 5% would be the 




sans recourse to ensure that the ARF cannot technically become insolvent under any 
conditions.  (Again there is no government guarantee.)  Though technically described as 
bonds, the subordinated participating sans recourse bonds have many of the characteristics of 
equity.  As argued below, these equity-like characteristics of the bonds are desirable elements 
of a workable ARF. 
 
Under this plan, the ARF can be regarded as a debt securitization arrangement.  Since the 
securitization is done on a sans recourse basis, the ARF does not need a large capital base.  The ARF 
cannot technically become insolvent under any conditions at all.  A capital of Rs. 100 crore would 
therefore be more than adequate even if the ARF has to handle problem assets of over Rs. 10,000 
crore.  The government may, if it so desires, provide this share capital, or it may ask the banks to 
collectively contribute this share capital also.  Since none of the liabilities of the ARF are guaranteed 
by the government, the burden on the public finance is practically nil. 
 
Hybrid instruments sharing some of the characteristics of debt and equity have proved useful in 
developed capital markets and a new term dequity has also been coined to describe them.  In the 
context of the ARF, the subordinated participating sans recourse bonds are a form of dequity.  The 
principal reason why such an instrument is needed is that valuation of thousands of loans is a difficult 
exercise where exactness is impossible to achieve.  This is compounded by the problem of asymmetric 
information: the bank which is trying to sell a loan to the ARF would know far more about the quality 
of the loan than the ARF can ever find out in the limited time at its disposal.  Without a strong 
element of dequity in the purchase price, the ARF scheme would be subject to severe problems of 
adverse selection which would make the whole idea unworkable.  The dequity component makes the 
valuation of the loan a less serious issue.  The bank does not lose much from undervaluation of the 
loan as a part of the money would come back to the bank through the participation in profits.   
Similarly, if the loan is overvalued, the sans recourse clause puts a limit to the loss that the ARF can 
make.   
 
The reason for setting the participation percentage at 95% rather than 100% is to provide an incentive 
to the ARF to recover the loans efficiently.  The 5% retained by the ARF constitute its profits, and 
these profits are directly linked to its recovery performance.  It also provides the ARF an incentive to 
value the loans conservatively.  This is essential for the valuations to be accepted by the investors to 





Vulture Funds: An Alternative to the ARF 
 
Barua and Varma (1994) proposed another solution to the problem-loan overhang of the past: what 
are known in western countries as "vulture funds".  As the very name suggests, the vulture fund 
thrives on the remains of sick and dying companies.  It eagerly buys up the debt of these companies at 
heavy discounts and then tries to recover the debt from the assets of the sick companies.  The vulture 
fund earns a good return on its funds if it is able to recover a sufficiently large fraction of the debt 
sufficiently fast.   
 
Wherever vulture funds have made an entry they have been the most aggressive parties in the 
bankruptcy proceedings trying both to speed up the winding up process and to realize the best 
possible value.  Unlike the other participants, the vulture funds are not burdened with the guilts and 
mistakes of the past.  They also have the clearest perception of the importance of time value of 
money.  A vulture fund which pays Rs. 3 crore for a debt of the face value of Rs. 10 crore earns an 
annual return of 20% if it realizes Rs. 3.6 crore after one year.  Its annual return is only 15% if it 
realizes Rs. 4 crore after two years.  This kind of analysis introduces a highly dynamic and positive 
thinking which is very crucial for a successful winding up.  In the natural world, the vulture helps 
return valuable organic material to the biosphere very rapidly; in a similar fashion, the vulture fund 
helps return valuable assets to productive use rapidly in the economic world. 
 
Strict provisioning and capital adequacy norms have made vulture funds very attractive to banks 
worldwide.  Under these norms, when a loan becomes non performing, the bank has to make a 
provision for possible losses.  Increasingly larger provisions are required as the loan remains non 
performing.  In India, for example, the RBI norms now require the banks to create a 100% provision 
if the loan remains non performing for more than two years.  When that happens, the bank is 
effectively carrying the loan in its books at zero value and it stands to gain in an accounting sense if it 
is able to sell the loan at even 10% of face value to a vulture fund.  The bank can show a higher profit, 
a larger net worth and a better capital adequacy ratio.  The bank might also gain a tax advantage as the 
sale to the vulture fund will allow the loss to be claimed for tax purpose while the provisions created 
by the banks may not be so admissible. 
 
We propose that the government should encourage the creation of vulture funds in India to allow the 
banks to rid themselves of the non performing assets at market determined prices.  This clearly means 
that there must be a sufficiently large number of such funds to create a competitive secondary market 





Some of the banks themselves could float and fund such funds if they are confident that they have 
superior ability in loan recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.  The disadvantage of this approach 
is that the banking system as a whole does not receive any infusion of funds.  Effectively, the banks 
would only end up trading loans against themselves and the past experience with participation 
certificates and similar schemes does not make one optimistic about the idea.   
 
The venture fund could be organized on the lines of a mutual fund with the money being raised from 
the general public.  The UTI and the public sector banks which have sponsored most of the mutual 
funds in India have considerable experience both in running mutual funds and in managing loan 
portfolios and can therefore run a vulture fund without too much difficulty.  Several amendments 
would however be required in the mutual funds guidelines to allow vulture funds to be set up as 
mutual funds. 
 
Vulture funds can also be set up by the non banking financial companies which do after all have a 
good record of lending to and recovering loans from less creditworthy borrowers.  If necessary, the 
financial company could segregate the vulture fund from its other businesses by organizing the fund 
as a separate entity which can attract investment by high net worth individuals. 
 
It is also possible for the government itself to set up such funds with financial assistance from the 
international lending agencies somewhat on the same lines as the National Renewal Fund. 
 
Finally, when it comes to the small loan portfolio of the banks (loans below Rs. 25,000 not covered 
by the provisioning norms at present), perhaps even the much despised moneylender may have a 
useful role to play.  He may be able to make a profit collecting loans which the organized sector 
cannot collect at all. 
 
One precondition for vulture funds to succeed is a drastic overhaul of our laws relating to 
rehabilitation and bankruptcy.  The Goswami committee has made an excellent set of 
recommendations in this regard.  The newly enacted Recovery of Debts Due from Banks and 
Financial Institutions Act (1993) providing for the setting up of special tribunals for the recovery of 
debts is a welcome step.  We propose that the vulture funds be notified as financial institutions for the 





Information Technology and Business Process Re-engineering 
 
Many of the arguments that we outlined above regarding the use of information technology in the 
stock markets apply with even greater force to the banking system as well.  The efficiency and 
reliability of the payment system is the foundation of the rest of the financial sector.  It need hardly be 
said that today the payment system is bursting at the seams and is simply unable to cope with the load 
of cheque clearing.  The Governor of the Reserve Bank of India is on record as saying that with the 
volume of cheque clearing growing at 12% annually he wonders what would have happened without 
the computerized cheque clearing technology (Rangarajan 1993).  For the small depositor, we have 
tried to short circuit the problem by offering immediate credit for cheques below a specified limit.  
But this is certainly not a long term solution.  We believe that we would have to move fairly quickly 
to an Electronic Fund Transfer System (EFTS).  Such a paperless system would provide efficiency, 
speed and reliability that the current system simply cannot achieve.   
 
However, the issue is not just one of technology alone.  It is as much if not more a matter of business 
process re-engineering.  Several banks have diversified into a wide range of financial services, but 
their current business processes do not enable them to tap the potential economies of scope.  For 
example, why does a bank sponsored mutual fund have to use cheques and dividend warrants while 
dealing with an account-holder in the same bank?  Why cannot the whole thing be run on book entries 
at much lower cost by letting the account-holder's branch act as the custodian of the units?  Why 
cannot the same thing be done even for other mutual funds by tying up with a bank?  The point is that 
(a) a lot can be achieved by simple business process redesign without too much of technology, and (b) 
the promised benefits of high-technology would not materialize if the technology adoption is not 
accompanied by a radical process redesign.  The issue in short is as much institutional as it is 




Our analysis of the stock market, debt market and the banking system clearly demonstrates the need 
for major institutional and technological changes in the Indian financial sector in order to face the 
challenges posed by liberalization and rapid growth.  In our view, the government and regulatory 
authorities have an important role in facilitating these changes.  Not only should regulatory 
hindrances be removed, but there should be a positive bias in favour of change.  We would like to 
reiterate that while many of the changes will have to take place at the level of individual economic 




that an agent who clings to antiquated methods of organization and operation imposes heavy 
transaction costs not only on himself but on the rest of the financial system as well.  Conversely, a 
firm which invests in modern technology does not reap the full benefits until other firms follow suit.  
A computer network is very much like a telephone system: what use is a phone to me if nobody else 
has a phone?  Given these externalities, one alternative is to push through the changes by regulatory 
fiat; a more market-oriented approach would be to evolve innovative pricing and market access 
schemes which reflect the true system wide costs of different institutional and technological 
alternatives.  For example, differential stock exchange listing fees could be used to encourage 
companies to issue securities in immobilized form; or differential access to trading facilities and 
differential commissions could be used to encourage individual investors to turn over their physical 
certificates to a depositary for immobilization.  In our view, it is necessary to abandon the built-in 
regulatory bias towards the status quo and create a regulatory regime biased towards the 
modernization of the institutional-technological base of our financial system.  We do believe that 
changes would take place even without regulatory support, but we also believe that regulatory 




Samir K. Barua (1993), SEBI's Regulatory Priorities: Need for Change, study commissioned by the 
Finance Minister. 
Samir K. Barua, V. Raghunathan, Jayanth R. Varma and N. Venkiteswaran (1993), Analysis of the 
Indian Securities Industry: Market for Debt, study commissioned by USAID. 
Samir K. Barua and Jayanth R. Varma (1993), "Can Vulture Funds Rescue Indian Banking", 
unpublished paper, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. 
Samir K. Barua and Jayanth R. Varma (1994), "Futures and Options: A Hasty Move", Economic 
Times, February 5, 1994. 
Robert Pardy (1992), Regulatory and Institutional Impacts of Securities Market Computerization, 
WPS 866, The World Bank. 
Barbara Pauley and Richard Brennan (1990), "Mortgage backed Bonds", in Kuhn, R.L. (ed) Mortgage 
and Asset Securitization, Library of Investment Banking, Vol. 5, Dow Jones, Homewood, Illinois. 
V. Raghunathan and Jayanth R. Varma (1993), "When AAA Means B: The State of Credit Rating in 
India", Working Paper No. 1143, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. 
Rangarajan, C (1993), "Technology and the Financial Sector", Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, 
48(11), p 1359-1362. 
Jayanth R. Varma (1993), Banking Reforms: Implementation Issues, study commissioned by the 





   
i.  The details about CATS is taken entirely from Robert Pardy (1992). 
ii.    Prices as quoted in The Economic Times, July 31, 1993. 
iii.   Bank of England, Issue of £3,000,000,000 7.25% Treasury Stock 1998 for Auction on 28 
April 1993, Prospectus for Applications for up to £500,000 Nominal of Stock. 
iv.   According to the National Account Statistics, 1992, the capital stock in dwellings and related 
activities in 1989-90 is Rs. 94,112 crores at 1980-81 prices (statement 20 item 8.2) and the 
price index for construction in 1989-90 (base 1980-81) is 298.6 (statement 3, item 4.1).  This 
implies that the capital stock was about Rs. 300,000 at 1989-90 prices. 
v.   Eighth Five Year Plan, 1992-97, Government of India, Planning Commission, New Delhi, 
1992, para 14.2.6. 
vi.   Eighth Five Year Plan, 1992-97, Government of India, Planning Commission, New Delhi, 
1992, para 14.4.7. 
vii.   We believe that this may not be really necessary as most investors would be confident that 
the government would not allow a subsidiary of the Reserve Bank of India to default.  The 
only concern that may be present is regarding the huge contingent liability that may arise out 
of NHB's settlement with the State Bank of India in respect of transactions in government 
securities during the securities scam. 
viii.   This would represent the discounted present value of the ultimate recoverable value of the 
loan. 
ix.   Barbara Pauley and Richard Brennan (1992). 
 